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This paper describes a simple model of aggregate and ﬁrm growth based on the introduction of
new goods. An incumbent ﬁrm can combine labor with blueprints for goods it already produces
to develop new blueprints. Every worker in the economy is also a potential entrepreneur who can
design a new blueprint from scratch and set up a new ﬁrm. The implied ﬁrm size distribution closely
matches the fat tail observed in the data when the marginal entrepreneur is far out in the tail of
the entrepreneurial skill distribution. The model produces a variance of ﬁrm growth that declines
with size. But the decline is more rapid than suggested by the evidence. The model also predicts a
new-ﬁrm entry rate equal to only 2.5% per annum, instead of the observed rate of 10% in U.S. data.
∗Luttmer, University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. This is a report on ongoing
research. The second half of this paper mimics parts of Luttmer [2006b]. Comments welcome. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Most ￿rms produce more than one good, and large ￿rms tend to produce many diﬀerent
goods. Producing certain goods can make it easier for a ￿rm to introduce new goods.
The rate at which a ￿rm introduces new goods is likely to depend on the number of
diﬀerent goods it already produces.
In this paper, a ￿rm can combine labor with the blueprint for any of the goods it
currently produces to develop blueprints for new goods, at a stochastic rate. These rates
are taken to be independent across goods. New ￿rms can be set up by entrepreneurs who
develop blueprints for new goods from scratch using only their time. Every worker in
the economy is a potential entrepreneur, but the frequency with which workers can come
up with ideas for new goods varies across workers. The entrepreneurial skill distribution
is assumed to have unbounded support so that there will always be some workers who
￿nd it optimal to become entrepreneurs.
Consumers in the economy have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over many diﬀerentiated
goods, and ￿rms are monopolists in the markets of the various goods they produce.
Goods are produced using a linear labor-only technology. The technology with which
labor is converted into goods becomes more productive over time at an exogenous rate
that is common to all producers. In equilibrium, the amount of labor used optimally
by a ￿rm to produce a particular good is constant over time, as is the amount of labor
used per good to develop new goods. The per capita labor supply is constant. Along
a balanced growth path, the number of diﬀerentiated goods produced in the economy
must therefore grow at the same rate as the population.
The shape of the ￿rm size distribution depends critically on how many new goods
are introduced by existing ￿rms, and how many are introduced by entrepreneurs who
develop a new good and set up a new ￿rm. If few workers have suﬃcient entrepreneurial
skill to become an entrepreneur, then most of the new goods are introduced by existing
￿rms and the growth rate of existing ￿rms is close to the population growth rate. There
will then be many incumbent ￿r m st h a th a v eh a dal o n gt i m et og r o w ,a n dt h er e s u l t i n g
size distribution will have the very fat tail observed in the data.
This paper complements the model described in Luttmer [2006a], in which every
￿rm is the monopolist producer of a single good and becomes more productive at a
￿rm-speci￿c idiosyncratic rate. In the model, ￿rm productivity follows an exogenously
speci￿ed geometric Brownian motion. The economy-wide distribution of productivity
improves over time as a result of selection and imitation by entrants. Stationarity
of the ￿rm size distribution is induced by the spillover that arises from the ability
1of entrants to imitate. The resulting ￿rm size distribution also closely matches the
observed distribution. The implied variance of ￿rm growth rates is constant, while here
it is inversely proportional to size. The data indicate something in between these two
extremes. One possible interpretation is that the mechanisms described here and in
Luttmer [2006a] are both needed to account for the empirical evidence.
Klette and Kortum [2003] build a model of ￿rm growth along the lines of the quality
ladder model of Grossman and Helpman [1991]. The stochastic process of the number
goods produced by an individual ￿rm obtained here for an economy with diﬀerentiated
commodities is the same as in Klette and Kortum [2003]. The quality ladder environment
has a constant number of goods. In the presence of entry, the average ￿rm therefore has
to decline in size. This rules out size distributions that are suﬃciently fat tailed. Here,
i n s t e a d ,t h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h ea v e r a g e￿rm can be positive if there is positive population
growth and incumbent ￿rms account for a suﬃcient fraction of the new goods introduced.
This is essential to replicate the fat tail of the observed ￿rm size distribution.
Section 2 describes the economy. The balanced growth path is characterized in
Section 3. The stochastic process of ￿rm size and the resulting stationary distribution
are analyzed in Section 4. The parameters of the size distribution are estimated in
Section 5 and the implications of these parameters for the research and development
productivity of ￿rms and for the skill distribution of entrepreneurs are discussed. Section
6 concludes.
2. Growth in Variety
2.1 Consumers
Time is continuous and indexed by t. There is a continuum of consumers alive at any
point in time. The population size at time t is Ht = Heηt, and the population growth
rate η is non-negative. There is a representative consumer with preferences over rates











The discount rate ρ and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/γ are positive. The
composite good is made up of a continuum of diﬀerentiated commodities. Preferences
over these commodities are additively separable and symmetric. This implies that all
commodities trading at the same price are consumed at the same rate. Let ct(p) be
2consumption at time t of a commodity that trades at a price p. In equilibrium, there
will be a measure Nt of commodities that are available at time t,d e ￿n e do nt h es e to f






















The price elasticity of the demand is −1/(1 − β) < −1 for all commodities.
E v e r yc o n s u m e ri se n d o w e dw i t ha￿ow of one unit of labor per unit of time that
c a nb es o l df o rw a g e so rb eu s e da sa ne n t r e p r e n e u r . C o n s u m e r sa l s oo w nc l a i m st o
￿rms. Contingent claims markets are complete and the representative consumer faces a
standard present-value budget constraint. There is no aggregate uncertainty. Optimal
consumption growth satis￿es the Euler condition







where rt is the interest rate expressed in units of the composite good.
2.2 Commodity Producers
Producing any particular commodity requires a unique commodity-speci￿cb l u e p r i n t .
The owner of such a blueprint can use l units of labor to produce Ztl units of the
associated diﬀerentiated commodity. The resulting revenues are Ct
1−β(Ztl)β,m e a s u r e d
in units of the composite good. Labor can be hired for wages wt.T h e c o m m o d i t y
producer solves





















Labor productivity is assumed to be the same across all producers and evolves according
to Zt = Zeθt.
Market clearing implies that ct(pt)=ZtLt for every commodity. Hence all producers
charge the same price pt and the number of commodities can be written as Nt = Nt(pt).










2.3 New Blueprints and Commodities
The introduction of new commodities requires new blueprints. There are two technolo-
gies for producing new blueprints. One combines the blueprint for an existing commodity
with labor to produce a diﬀerent blueprint. The other uses the input of an entrepreneur
only to develop a new blueprint from scratch. There is no technology for copying existing
blueprints.
2.3.1 Combining Existing Blueprints and Labor
Any existing blueprint can be combined with a ￿ow of It units of labor to produce a
blueprint for a new commodity. The new blueprint is completed following an expo-
nentially distributed waiting time with mean ￿t = f(It). The production function f is
strictly increasing and concave, with an unbounded marginal product at zero. Blueprints
depreciate, in one-hoss-shay fashion, at some non-negative rate λ.
A blueprint allows its owner to jointly produce a commodity and new blueprints.
The price of a blueprint st must satisfy the Bellman equation
rtst =m a x
￿t≤f(It)
{wt [Rt − It]+( ￿t − λ)st +D st},





≥ Df(It),w . e .i fIt > 0.( 6 )
Not surprisingly, the search intensity for new blueprints is high when the price of a










[ru + λ − ￿u]du
¶
wv [Rv − Iv]dv.( 7 )
This is simply the present value of all the net revenues that will ￿ow from a particular
blueprint and the sequences of future blueprints that will be produced from it. Given a
time path for interest rates rt,w a g e swt and net revenues Rt, (6) and (7) determine the
growth rate ￿t = f(It) and the value st of a blueprint.
2.3.2 Entrepreneurs
All consumers in the economy are potential entrepreneurs who can attempt to design
new blueprints from scratch. Consumers are heterogeneous and must choose to either
supply one unit of labor at wage wt or become an entrepreneur. A type-x consumer
can generate a new blueprint after an exponentially distributed waiting time x.A n
entrepreneur with a newly designed blueprint at time t can sell this blueprint at a price
st and then go on to design the next blueprint, or work for the wage wt.1 All consumers
with xst >w t choose to be entrepreneurs and all agents with xst <w t choose to work
at wage wt. The cross-sectional distribution of productivities has support (0,∞) and
is denoted by S. Hence, a fraction S(wt/st) of low-productivity consumers works for
￿rms, and a fraction 1 − S(wt/st) become entrepreneurs. The labor endowment of a
type-x consumer has market value max{wt,xs t}, and so the shape of S will be re￿ected
in the distribution of earnings at a point in time, and in the distribution of wealth across
consumers if entrepreneurial skills are permanent.
2.3.3 Aggregate Innovation
New commodities are introduced by entrepreneurs at a rate νt,m e a s u r e di nn e wc o m -
modities per unit of time as a fraction of the existing number of commodities at time t.
1A more realistic scenario might be if the entrepreneur would, at least for while, be more eﬃcient
than others at using the newly developed blueprint to produce the commodity or design new blueprints
based on it. This would generate a type of match similar to the one between ￿rms and managers
analyzed in Holmes and Schmitz [1995].





This follows since there are Ht potential entrepreneurs, x i st h er a t ea tw h i c ha ni n d i v i d -
ual entrepreneur generates a new blueprint, and only those consumers with x>w t/st
choose to act as entrepreneurs. Together with investment by owners of existing blue-
prints, entrepreneurial activity generates a ￿ow of new blueprints equal to
DNt =( νt + ￿t − λ)Nt. (9)
T h ei n i t i a ls t o c ko fb l u e p r i n t si sg i v e nb yN0 = N.
2.4 Equilibrium
Af r a c t i o nS(wt/st) of the Ht consumers in the economy use their unit of time to supply
labor. The amount of labor used by owners of existing blueprints to produce new blue-
prints is It per blueprint and production takes Lt units of labor per commodity. There






= Nt [It + Lt] (10)
at any time t.
Consumer wealth equals the present value of labor and entrepreneurial income, to-
gether with the value of the stock of blueprints stNt. In equilibrium, this must add up
to the present value of aggregate consumption Ct. This restriction implies a transversal-
ity condition for stNt. The equilibrium is determined by this transversality condition,
together with the other equilibrium conditions (1)-(10), as well as an initial condition
for N0 and the exogenous evolution of Zt.
3. Balanced Growth
A balanced growth path for this economy is a competitive equilibrium in which Ct =
Ce(κ+η)t and wt = weκt for some equilibrium growth rate κ, and in owners of existing
blueprints develop new blueprints at a constant rate ￿t = ￿.
Because the marginal product of f at zero is in￿nite, ￿ and I = f−1(￿) must be
positive. Hence (6) implies that st/wt is constant, and thus st = seκt. Constant con-
sumption growth rate implies a constant interest rate rt = r,w h e r er = ρ + γκ.T h e
fact that wt and st both grow at the rate κ implies that Rt = R, by (7). Because of (2),
6labor inputs can also be written as Lt = L.S i n c eZt, wt and Ct grow at the respective
rates θ, κ and κ + η, (4)-(5) imply that Nt = Neηt and






along any balanced growth path. The number of commodities must grow at the same
rate as the population, and this growth adds to productivity growth with an elasticity
(1 − β)/β.
Along any balanced growth path, the ￿rst-order condition (6) and the present-value









r − κ + λ − f(I)
, (12)
as long as f(I) <r− κ + λ. This condition relates investment I in new blueprints
to the amount of labor L used to produce a commodity. This relation depends on
the precise properties of the production function f. In the following, suppose that
I +[ r − κ + λ − f(I)]/Df(I) is increasing in I for f(I) <r−κ + λ. Then (12) implies
that L is increasing in I. In this case, the equilibrium value of a blueprint rises with I
because more labor is used to generate more revenues, and not so much because those
revenues are discounted at a lower rate.







Using (12) to eliminate L from the right-hand side of (13) gives an expression that is
increasing in I.I f￿ = f(I) is high, then blueprint owners must be using a lot of labor
to produce commodities and design new blueprints. On the other hand many consumers
will also choose to be entrepreneurs, because s/w =1 /Df(I) is high. Under such
circumstances, the labor market can only clear if there are relatively few commodities.
Thus (12)-(13) imply a negatively sloped relation between N and I.T h e a s s u m p t i o n
that the marginal product Df(I) is unbounded at zero implies that N goes to in￿nity
as I goes to zero along the equilibrium relation implied by (12)-(13).
The result that the number of commodities grows at a rate η along a balanced growth
path implies that investment in new blueprints by entrepreneurs and incumbent ￿rms
must satisfy






7by (8) and (9). Since S has unbounded support, this condition ensures that f(I) < η+λ
in any equilibrium. The right-hand side of (14) is increasing I. Blueprint owners produce
more blueprints and more consumers choose to be entrepreneurs when s/w =1 /Df(I)
and thus I is high. The rate at which new blueprints must be produced along a balanced
growth path is (η+λ)N per unit of time, and a high I c a nt h u ss u p p o r tah i g hv a l u eo fN.
It follows that (14) implies an increasing relation between N and I for all f(I) < η +λ.
The assumption that S has unbounded support guarantees that N goes to in￿nity as
f(I) approaches η+λ from below. Therefore, N must go to zero as I goes to zero along
(14).
Note that r follows from the Euler equation (1) and (11). The levels of aggregate
consumption C and wages w are implied by (4) and (5), given L and N. The equilibrium
conditions (12)-(14) are shown in Figure I. They determine I, L,a n dN, and hence
￿ = f(I) and s/w =1 /Df(I).T h e￿rst part of the following proposition now follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose r>κ+η,t h a tI +[η+λ−f(I)]/Df(I) is increasing in I for
all I such that f(I) < η + λ, and that entrepreneurial skill distribution S is continuous
with support (0,∞).I fr>η, then there is a unique balanced growth path de￿ned by
(12)-(14). Suppose f(I)=g(AI) and S(x)=G(x/B),w h e r eg is a production function
and G a distribution function. Across balanced growth paths,
(i) the elasticities of [N,C/H,s/w] with respect to H are [1,(1 − β)/β,0];
(ii) the elasticities of [N,C/H,s/w] with respect to A = B are [1,(1 − β)/β,−1];
(iii) if consumers are endowed with J units of labor, then the elasticities of [N,C/H,s/w]
with respect to J are [1,1/β,0];
(iv) ￿ = f(I) converges to η + λ from below as B goes to zero.
There is no eﬀect on ￿ = f(I) in (i)-(iii).
Strictly concave constant-elasticity production functions satisfy the condition given in
this proposition. Note that Z does not appear in the equilibrium conditions (12)-(14),
and hence per capita consumption has a unit elasticity with respect to labor productiv-
ity in commodity production, by (4). This and the per capita consumption elasticity
reported in (i) matches (11). Labor-augmenting technological progress in blueprint pro-
duction that is neutral across entrepreneurs and blueprint owners, as in (ii), has the
8same eﬀect as a population increase on the number of commodities and per capita con-
sumption. In both cases it is possible to sustain a larger number of commodities, and the
increased variety implies an increase in per capita consumption. But this type of techno-
logical progress in blueprint production lowers the per-commodity inputs L and I,a n d
this lowers s/w, thereby reducing the dispersion of earnings max{1,xs/w}. Population
growth leaves the distribution of earnings unchanged. An increase in per capita labor
supply, as in (iii), is equivalent to a population increase combined with a proportional
increase in labor productivity in commodity production.



















η  + λ
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Figure I. Equilibrium Conditions for N/H and ￿ = f(I).
Result (iv) of Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure I for functional forms and para-
m e t e r sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n5 .A sB goes to zero the fraction of consumers G(Df(I)/B)
who are not entrepreneurs goes to 1 for any ￿xed I.T h u s t h e c u r v e d e ￿ned by the
equilibrium conditions (12)-(13) converges to one de￿ned by (12) and N/H =1 /(I +L).
In Figure I, B is reduced by a factor three without a perceptible eﬀect on the rela-
tion (12)-(13). Entrepreneurs are largely irrelevant for labor market clearing when B
is small. But N/H as a function of ￿ = f(I) converges to zero along (14) for any
￿ = f(I) < η+λ. For any ￿xed level I<f −1(η+λ) of investment by blueprint owners,
the number of commodities that is sustainable along a balanced growth path converges
to zero as entrepreneurs become less and less eﬃcient in coming up with new blueprints.
As a result, the equilibrium ￿ = f(I) shown in Figure I converges to the asymptote
9at η + λ. Existing blueprint owners will then account for essentially all growth in the
number of blueprints and commodities.
4. The Size Distribution of Firms
The economy described so far has consumers who are also workers and entrepreneurs.
Everyone can own blueprints and there are no ￿rms.
4.1 Transaction Costs
Consider an entrepreneur who has just developed a new blueprint. To hire labor to
produce the associated commodity and develop further blueprints, the entrepreneur can
set up a ￿rm at no cost. This de￿nes a ￿rm entry. Claims to ￿rms can be traded
freely. But there is a potentially very small cost involved in ￿rms hiring entrepreneurs
to develop new blueprints from scratch, in selling blueprints to ￿r m s ,a n di nm e r g i n g
￿rms. There are no cost advantages to any of these transactions, and so they will not
occur in equilibrium.2
A ￿rm will therefore only gain new commodities through its use of the technology
for combining existing blueprints with labor, at a rate ￿t per commodity already owned
by the ￿rm. The ￿rm only loses commodities as its blueprints become obsolete, at a
rate λ per commodity. A ￿rm that has lost all its commodities is shut down and exits.
In this environment, ￿rms diﬀer only by the number of commodities they produce, and
t h i sn u m b e rc a nb eu s e dt om e a s u r et h es i z eo fa￿rm. In the following, the distribution
of ￿rm size is derived assuming that the economy is on a balanced growth path.
The measure of ￿rms with n commodities at time t is denoted by Mn,t. Since every





Over time, the change in the number of ￿rms with one commodity is
DM1,t = λ2M2,t + νNt − (λ + ￿)M1,t. (16)
2Of course these transactions do occur in the data. This is a familiar and important failure of the
type of model described in this paper. Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg [2006] provide an interesting
model of ￿rm size in which adverse selection makes it diﬃcult for ￿rms to hire entrepreneurs or buy
their projects.
10where ￿ and ν = η + λ − ￿ are the values of ￿t and νt along the balanced growth path.
The number of ￿rms with one commodity increases because ￿rms with two commodities
lose one, or because of entry. The number declines because ￿rms with one commodity
gain or lose a commodity. Similarly, the number of ￿rms with n ∈ N \{1} commodities
evolves according to
DMn,t = λ(n +1 ) Mn+1,t + ￿(n − 1)Mn−1,t − (λ + ￿)nMn,t. (17)
The joint dynamics of Nt and {Mn,t}∞
n=1 is fully described by DNt = ηNt and (16)-(17).
By construction, (16)-(17) ensure that (15) holds if it holds at the initial date, which is
assumed to be the case.
4.2 The Stationary Distribution
A stationary distribution of ￿rm size exists if (16)-(17) has a solution for which Mn,t/Nt
is constant over time. Since Nt grows at a rate η,t h i sm e a n st h a tDMn,t = ηMn,t for all




for all n ∈ N. This is the fraction of ￿rms that produce n commodities. Analytically





for all n ∈ N. The mean number of commodities per ￿r mc a nb ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so ft h e


















The numerator of the left-hand side adds up to the total measure of commodities in
the economy. This is ￿nite by construction. Hence the mean ￿rm size is well de￿ned
and ￿nite by construction. The right-hand side is the reciprocal of the mean number of
￿rms per commodity, provided that this mean is calculated against the distribution of
commodities by size of ￿rm producing the commodity.
Recall that ￿ − λ = η − ν. Using this, (16) can now be written as
ηQ1 = λQ2 + η − (￿ − λ) − (λ + ￿)Q1, (18)
11and (17) implies that
1
n
ηQn = λQn+1 + ￿Qn−1 − (λ + ￿)Qn, (19)
for n ∈ N \{1}. Condition (15) corresponds to the requirement that the fractions Qn
a d du pt oo n e ,
∞ X
n=1
Qn =1 . (20)
Any sequence {Qn}∞
n=1 ⊂ [0,1] that satis￿es (18)-(20) de￿nes a stationary size distribu-
tion {Pn}∞
n=1 via Qn ∝ Pn/n. Note that (18)-(20) only depend on the parameters ￿/λ
and η/λ.











n = ∞  
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λ /µ  
Figure II. The Dynamics of {βn}∞
n=1.
The equation (19) is a second-order diﬀerence equation in {Qn}∞
n=1.I tc o m e sw i t h
two boundary conditions, (18) and (20). To solve (18)-(20), it is convenient to reduce








for all n ∈ N and some sequence {βn}∞
n=1.S e tβ2 =1 /(1 + (η + ￿)/λ). Then the initial




[η − (￿ − λ)] (22)


















From the de￿nition of β2, observe that the recursion (24) holds for all n ∈ N if initialized
by β1 =0 . The recursion (24) is depicted in Figure II for the case ￿>λ.N o t e
in particular that the curve de￿ned by (24) shifts upwards as n increases. Using this
observation and the diagram, as well as an analogous diagram for λ >￿ ,o n ec a nv e r i f y
that {βn}∞
n=1 converges monotonically from β1 =0to min{1,λ/￿}.
The sequence {Zn}∞
n=2 is completely determined by (22)-(23). Observe from (21)
that Qn = βn+1(Qn+1 + Zn+1). The boundary condition (20) together with the fact
that βn ≤ 1 implies that QK
QK
n=1 βn must converges to zero as K becomes large. Thus
one can iterate forward to obtain the solution for {Qn}∞
n=1. The following proposition
presents this solution and provides upper and lower bounds Qn when n is large.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ￿, λ, η and ν = η − (￿ − λ) are positive. De￿ne the
sequence {βn}∞
n=1 by the recursion (24) and the initial condition β1 =0 . This sequence


















Take any ε > 0.I f￿>λ then
ν













for all large enough n.I f￿<λ then
ν














for all large enough n.
Note that the balanced growth path described in Proposition 1 implies ν > 0.T h e
proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A shows that the solution (25) satis￿es (20). The
distribution {Pn}∞
n=1 follows immediately from Pn ∝ Qn/n.
134.3 The Right Tail







for all large enough n.W h e nλ >￿ , the properties of this product are quite diﬀerent
from what they are when ￿<λ.I fλ >￿ ,t h e nQn is bounded above by a multiple of the
geometrically declining sequence (￿/λ)n. On the other hand, if ￿>λ then ￿βn/λ ↑ 1,
and hence the right-hand side of (28) declines at a rate that is slower than any given
geometric rate. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that the right-hand side of (28) is
nevertheless summable. The following proposition gives a further characterization of
the right tail of the distribution.
Proposition 3 Suppose that η > 0, ￿>λ and η >￿− λ. Then the right tail








for any z smaller than the tail index ζ = η/(￿ − λ).







∼ c − ζ ln(K) (29)
for some constant c. The limiting tail index ζ =1associated with Zipf￿s law arises when
the entry rate ν = η − (￿ − λ) converges to zero.
4.4 Entry and Exit Rates
The entry rate νNt represents the rate per unit of time at which new commodities are
introduced by new ￿rms. Each new ￿rm starts with one commodity, and so νNt is also
the number of new ￿rms that enters per unit of time. The ￿rm entry rate φ as a fraction
of the number of incumbent ￿rms is therefore equal to νNt divided by the number of
￿rms in the economy,
∞ X
n=1














14That is, the ￿rm entry rate is equal to the rate ν at which new commodities are intro-
duced by new ￿rms, times the average number of commodities per ￿rm. The only ￿rms
that exit in this economy are one-commodity ￿rms. There are NtQ1 such ￿rms, and
they each exit at a rate λ. The balance [φ − λQ1]Nt of ￿rms entering and exiting per
unit of time must equal η times the total number of ￿rms. On a per-commodity basis,
this gives
ν |{z}












This can be veri￿ed mechanically by adding up (18) and (19) over all n. In terms of
{Pn}∞




nPn = η + λP1.
Eliminating the mean number of commodities per ￿rm from (30) and (31) yields φ/η =
1/(1 − (λ/ν)Q1) a n dt h e nt h em e a n￿rm size is φ/ν =( η/ν)(1 − (λ/ν)Q1).T o g e t h e r
with the expression for Q1 implied by (25) this gives explicit solutions for the ￿rm entry
rate and the mean ￿rm size.
4.5 Special Cases
As will be shown in Section 5, the empirically relevant ￿r ms i z ep r o c e s si so n ew i t hl a r g e
￿ and λ,w h e r e￿>λ and where ν = η − (￿ − λ) is positive but very close to zero.
These conditions are violated in some well-known special cases of the ￿rm size process
(15)-(17). Taking the limit ν ↓ 0 gives a tractable special case that is very close to what
is observed in U.S. data.
4.5.1 The Logarithmic Series Distribution
Suppose there is no population growth, η =0 , and so no growth in the aggregate
number of commodities. Then ￿<λ and hence the size distribution must have a
geometrically declining right tail. The sequence {βn}∞
n=1 is simply β1 =0and βn =1
for all larger n. The transition (19) simpli￿es to [Qn+1−Qn]=( ￿/λ)[Qn−Qn−1].C l e a r l y ,
Qn+1 − Qn ∝ (￿/λ)n,a n dt h e nQn ∝ (￿/λ)n as well. The resulting size distribution
{Pn}∞










15This is the distribution that arises in Klette and Kortum [2004]. The mean of this
distribution is easy to compute, and ν = λ−￿. The resulting ￿rm entry rate (30) equals










This ratio ranges from 1 to 0 as ￿/λ ranges from 0 to 1. To obtain a size distribution
with a right tail that decays at a slow geometric rate one needs ￿ close to λ >￿ .T h i s
implies φ/λ close to 0.H i g ho b s e r v e de n t r yr a t e st h e ni m p l yh i g hv a l u e so fλ.
4.5.2 The Yule Process
Consider the case λ =0and ￿ ∈ (0,η). In this scenario, ￿rms can only grow. A
stationary size distribution arises because not all ￿r m sh a v eh a dt h es a m et i m et og r o w ,
and the population of ￿rms itself grows. The entry rate is ν = η − ￿, and the resulting
stochastic process is known as the Yule process. It was used by Simon [1955] as a
model for various skewed empirical distributions, including the city size distribution.









































Since K1−aΓ(K+a)/Γ(K+1)converges to 1 as m becomes large, these tail probabilities
behave like K−η/￿ for large K, as predicted by Proposition 3.
The size distribution has a mean 1/(1 − ￿/η), and so the formula for the ￿rm entry
rate (30) reduces to φ = η, as expected. The limiting distribution as ￿ ↑ η,o rν ↓ 0,i s
Pn =1 /[n(n+1)]. This is the discrete analog of the Pareto distribution that corresponds
16to Zipf￿s law. The right tail probabilities of this limiting distribution are exactly 1/n,
and so the distribution has no well de￿ned mean.
One can verify that the stationary distribution would be Pn =( η/￿)(1 + η/￿)−n if
individual ￿rms gain commodities at a rate ￿ instead of ￿n. This corresponds to an
environment in which a fraction (￿/η)/
P∞
n=1 nPn of the ￿ow ηNt of new commodities
is introduced by incumbent ￿rms and the remaining fraction 1/
P∞
n=1 nPn by new ￿rms.
By itself, population growth is not enough to generate the heavy right tail. It needs to
be combined with geometric growth of the individual ￿rms.
4.5.3 The Limiting Case ν ↓ 0
As before, assume that η > 0 and λ > 0. Letting ν approach zero from above implies
that η = ￿ − λ in the limit. In this limit, the recursion (19) for Qn ∝ nPn becomes
(￿ − λ)Pn = λ(n +1 ) Pn+1 + ￿(n − 1)Pn−1 − (λ + ￿)nPn,












for all n ∈ N \{1}. Iterating on (33) gives Xn+1 =( 2 /[n(n +1 ) ] ) X2.S i n c et h ePn have
t oa d du pt o1,i tm u s tb et h a tPn → 0.T h e f a c t t h a t λ/￿ < 1 then implies that we















































17by the dominated convergence theorem. Thus the right tail probabilities behave like
1/K, and the log right tail probabilities expressed as a function of ln(K) must asymptote
to a straight line with slope −1. The distribution does not have a ￿nite mean.
A tt h es a m et i m ea st h er a t eν at which commodities are introduced by entrepreneurs
who set up new ￿rms converges to zero, the number of ￿rms per commodity also goes
to zero. But the entry rate of new ￿rms satis￿es φ = η + λP1, and this converges to a







This allows one to infer ￿ and λ = ￿ − η simply from the ratio of the ￿rm entry rate φ
and the population growth rate η.
5. U.S. Employer Firms
U.S. Internal Revenue Service statistics contain more than 26 million corporations, part-
nerships and non-farm proprietorships. Business statistics collected by the U.S. Census
consist of both non-employer ￿rms and employer ￿rms. In 2002 there were more than
17 million non-employer ￿rms, many with very small receipts, and close to 6 million
employer ￿rms. In the following, Census data on employer ￿rms assembled by the U.S.
Small Business Administration (SBA) will be considered. For employer ￿rms, part-time
employees are included in employee counts, as are executives. But proprietors and part-
ners of unincorporated business are not (Armington [1998, p.9]). This is likely to create
signi￿cant biases in measured employment for small ￿rms.
Figures III and IV show the 2002 numbers of ￿rms in the right and left tails of the
size distribution of U.S. employer ￿rms. In the data, size is measured by number of
employees. The number of commodities produced by a ￿rm is inferred by dividing the
number of employees by an estimate of L + I that is described below. Employer ￿rms
reported to have 0 to 4 employees during the observation period in March 2002 are
interpreted to have L+I to 4 employees. The tail index for this data is ζ ≈ 1.06￿note
from (29) that ζ does not depend on the units in which ￿rm size is measured. U.S.
population growth is around 1% per annum. These two numbers imply that incumbent
￿rms introduce new commodities at an average net annual rate of ￿ − λ = η/ζ ≈ .94%.
Since ζ is so close to 1, this is only slightly below the population growth rate. Observe
that ν = η − (￿ − λ)=η(1 − 1/ζ) ≈ .057%. The rate at which commodities are
introduced by new ￿r m si so n l ya b o u t.057% per annum.




































ζ  = 1.06
ζ  = 1
L + I = 1
 5 or more employees
Figure III. Right Tail of the Size Distribution.































ζ  = 1.06
ζ  = 1
L + I = 1
                         up to 4 employees
Figure IV. Left Tail of the Size Distribution.
Figures III and IV also show ￿tted size distributions for the case ζ =1 .06 implied
by the data and for the limiting case of ζ =1 .W h e nm e a s u r e db ye m p l o y m e n t ,t h es i z e
distribution depends not only on ￿/η and λ/η, but also on the number of employees per
commodity L+I.T h e￿tted distribution for ζ =1 .06 is obtained by choosing ￿/η, λ/η
19and L + I to approximate the empirical distribution show in Figure IV, subject to the
restriction ζ = η/(￿ − λ)=1 .06. The resulting estimates are L + I =1 , λ = .03969
and ￿ = .04912.G i v e nζ,t h er a t i o￿/λ mainly aﬀects the shape of the left tail of the
distribution. Alternative choices for L + I give rise to horizontal shifts by −ln(L + I)
of the curve representing the data in Figure III. The estimate L + I =1 , one employee
per commodity, suggests that the ￿rm size distribution is best approximated with very
narrowly de￿ned, highly diﬀerentiated commodities.
5.1 Inferring Productivity and Entrepreneurial Skill Parameters
The equilibrium conditions shown in Figure I arise from the iso-elastic production func-
tion f(I)=g(AI)=( AI)α with α ∈ (0,1), and the skill distribution S(x)=G(x/B),
where G is the FrØchet distribution G(z)=e−1/z2. The labor share parameter is α = .7
and β = .9, implying a 10% markup of price over unit labor costs. The interest rate
is r = .04,i na c c o r dw i t hc o m m o n l yu s e de s t i m a t e sb a s e do nU . S .d a t a . T h es t a t i o n -
ary ￿rm size distribution with size measured by employment identi￿es ￿/η, λ/η and
L+I. The shape restriction f(I)=g(AI) together with the equilibrium condition (12)
then identify A and I and L separately. The implied value of a new blueprint is only
s/w =1 .6. As a result, the marginal entrepreneur must be coming up with an average
of about two new blueprints every three years. Using (13) to eliminate N/H from (14)
gives







The left-hand side of (36) equals .00057, implying that the marginal entrepreneur must
be very far out in the tail of the entrepreneurial skill distribution. This restriction
identi￿es the scale parameter B, given the shape restriction S(x)=G(x/B) and the
productivity of the marginal entrepreneur w/s that was inferred from the present-value
condition (12). The stationary size distribution therefore identi￿es the scale parameters
A and B,g i v e nβ and the functions g and G.
Clearly, one has to go beyond ￿rm size data alone to infer the preference parameter
β and the shapes of the production function f and the entrepreneurial skill distribution
S.
5.2 Over-Identifying Restrictions
The average number of commodities per ￿rm implied ￿/η and λ/η is 1/[
P∞
n=1 Qn/n]=
44.2. Combining the stationary distribution with the observed population growth rate
20gives the ￿ and λ reported above, and then ν ≈ .00057. The resulting entry rate of new
￿rms is then φ ≈ .00057 ￿ 44.2 ≈ .025,b y( 3 0 ) . T h eζ =1approximation (35) gives
essentially the same estimate. This 2.5% entry rate of new ￿rms is well below what can
be observed directly. In the SBA data, the number of new employer ￿rms that enter and
survive during a year is about 10% of the number of incumbent ￿rms. Ignoring even
the fact that ￿rms may enter and exit within a year, the parameters inferred from the
stationary distribution and the population growth rate only account for about a quarter
of the observed entry rate. According to these parameters, ￿rms move up and down the
￿rm size distribution at fairly low rates, implying a puzzle: why is there so much entry?
Jovanovic [1982] is a classic answer that is abstracted from in the model described here.
In the SBA employer ￿rm data for 2002, roughly 6 million employer ￿rms employ
about 110 million employees. If this is taken to be an estimate of aggregate employment
then another estimate of L + I is










This is half of the estimate L+I =1derived from ￿tting the stationary size distribution
in Figure III. Thus the ￿tted distribution implies an average ￿rm that is too large. To
some extent this can be attributed to the fact that the average ￿rm size is extremely
sensitive to small changes in ζ > 1 near the asymptote 1. The mean of the size distri-
bution behaves like 1/(ζ − 1).V a l u e so fζ that are slightly higher than ζ =1 .06 imply
signi￿cantly fewer commodities per ￿rm than the estimated 44.2, and hence a higher
estimate of L + I than (37). A related source of discrepancy between (37) and the
L+I =1estimated in Figures III and IV is the fact that the empirical size distribution
necessarily has a ￿nite support. Because the estimated tail index ζ is so close to 1,
truncating the estimated distribution can lead to large reductions in its mean.3
Over short intervals of time, the variance of ￿rm growth is (λ + ￿)/n for a ￿rm
with n commodities. The estimated standard deviation of a ￿rm with n commodities is
therefore
p
(λ + ￿)/n ≈ .29801/
√
n. Hence the standard deviation of the growth rate
of a small ￿rm with 9 employees and commodities is only about 10% per annum. The
standard deviation of the returns on the stocks of the much larger ￿rms traded on the
NYSE is about is about 30% per annum. Leverage and other factors probably make
these returns more volatile than the standard deviation of ￿rm growth. But the 10%
standard deviation for a ￿rm with fewer than 10 employees is likely to be too low.
3Gabaix [2005] and Atkeson and Burstein [2006a] emphasize the sensitivity of predictions of models
of this type for aggregates and employment levels in the right tail of the distribution.
21As emphasized by Klette and Kortum [2004], the empirical evidence suggests that
t h ev a r i a n c eo f￿rm growth rates declines more slowly than 1/n. Hymer and Pashigian
[1962] compared standard deviations of ￿rm growth rates across size quartiles and found
that ￿rms in the largest quartile were signi￿cantly more volatile than predicted by the
1/n rule. More recently, Stanley et al [1996] and Sutton [2002] ￿nd that the variance of
the growth rate of Compustat ￿rms behaves like 1/n1/3. Tentative interpretations are
given in Stanley et al [1996] and Sutton [2002, 2006].
6. Concluding Remarks
U.S. ￿rm data exhibit (i) high entry rates, (ii) growth rate standard deviations that
decline with ￿rm size at a rate that is slower than one over the square root of ￿rm size,
and (iii) a size distribution with many small ￿r m sa n dav e r yl o n gr i g h tt a i l .L u t t m e r
[2006a] and the current paper provide alternative interpretations of (iii). Both papers
require large amounts of randomness to deal with (i). The two papers seem to be on
opposite sides of the data when it comes to (ii). Finding tractable equilibrium models
of this phenomenon is task for further research.
Skewed ￿rm size distributions are interpreted as re￿ecting skewed productivity dis-
tributions in Hopenhayn [1992], Klette and Kortum [2004], Lentz and Mortensen [2006],
Luttmer [2006a] and Atkeson and Burstein [2006b]. Furthermore, the continuous real-
location of resources across ￿rms plays a crucial role in generating aggregate growth.
In Lucas [1978] and Gabaix and Lanier [2006] an assignment problem relates the ￿rm
size and talent distributions. By contrast, in Simon and Bonini [1958] and Ijiri and
Simon [1964] ￿rm size does not aﬀect aggregate outcomes because all ￿rms operate un-
der constant returns to scale. Similarly, ￿rms in the economy described here and in
Luttmer [2006b] are all equally productive. The relative importance of each of these
interpretations of the ￿rm size distribution remains to be sorted out.
A Proof of Proposition 2























22Since βn ≤ min{1,λ/￿} this implies the upper bounds in (26) and (27). Take some ε > 0.
The lower bounds rely on βn ↑ min{1,λ/￿}.I f￿>λ, then eventually βn ≥ (λ/￿)(1+ε),
and this gives the lower bound in (26). If ￿<λ,t h e n1/(1 + ε) ≤ βn for all large
enough n, and this implies (27). Thus the sums de￿ning {Qn}∞
n=1 converge and (26)
and (27) hold. By construction, the candidate solution satis￿es (18)-(19). It remains to
prove the adding-up condition (20), which ensures that {Qn}∞









for all n ∈ N \{1}. Note from the bounds (26)-(27) that the sequence {Qn}∞
n=1 is
summable if and only if {Fn/n}∞






















Observe from this that Xn+1 < −1 if and only if Xn satis￿es
Xn <
η − (￿ − λ)
λ
− 1 (39)
Since η >￿− λ,t h i si st r u ei fXn ≤− 1. But this follows by induction starting from
X1 = −1.T h e ￿xed point for the n = ∞ version of (38) is −η/(￿ − λ) < −1.O n e
can verify that Xn converges to this ￿xed point starting from X1 = −1.T h ef a c tt h a t
limn→∞ Xn < −1 implies that {Fn/n}∞
n=1 is summable, by Raabe￿s test. The inequality










for all K. Since the left-hand side is summable, it must be that F∞ =0 .
Write (18) as ηQ1 = λ[Q2 − Q1]+η − (￿ − λ) − ￿Q1 and (19) as
ηQn = λn[Qn+1 − Qn] − ￿n[Qn − Qn−1],




Qn = η − (￿ − λ)+λ
∞ X
n=1








Note that n[Qn+1 − Qn]=( n +1 ) Qn+1 − nQn − Qn+1 and n[Qn − Qn−1]=nQn − (n −
1)Qn−1 − Qn−1, and observe that the candidate solution (25) satis￿es limn→∞ nQn =0 ,










Qn.( 4 1 )
Together with η >￿− λ, (40) and (41) imply that the sequence {Qn}∞
n=1 adds up to 1.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that Pn ∼ Fn/n2 and de￿ne RK =
P∞

























If the sum on the right-hand side is ￿nite, then limK→∞ KzRK =0 .As u ﬃcient condition











































Observe that limn→∞ An =1− z. The limiting recursion for Xn is therefore






(Xn − [1 − z]),
and this has the unique ￿xed point 1 − z + ζ. One can verify that Xn converges to this
￿xed point starting from X1 = −1.T h u sz<ζ guarantees convergence.




























































and hence ξ = −ln(1 − λ/￿)=l n ( η/￿). Using the fact that η = ￿ − λ,o n ec a nw r i t e
the entry rate as












which is the result reported in (35).
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